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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SYBIL R. BIRCH,

]

Plaintiff/Respondent,

)

vs.

])

Case No. 870457-CA

]1

Priority 14b

ALLEN G. BIRCH,
Defendant/Appellant.

]

The defendant/appellant,f Allen G. Birch, responds to
respondent's Brief as follows:
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff apparently sets forth her Statement of the
Facts on pages 3 through 7 of her Brief.

On page 3 she denies

having talked with Judge Rigtrup, but that denial should have
been contained in a counter-affidavit in the lower court, not
in Respondent's Brief.

It was not so included in a counter-

affidavit.
Also on page 3 respondent denies that the house was paid
with indemnity money.

To support that assertion she * attaches a

savings account exhibit shown for the first time in her Addendum.
It was not presented in the lower court.

It would perhaps not be

objectionable to show information like that if it were the
plaintiff who was seeking to show what the evidence in the lower
court would have been had an evidentiary hearing been granted.

It

is certainly not proper for plaintiff to attempt to put on her
case for the first time in the appellate court.

To be canvassed

on appeal that exhibit would have to have been presented to the
lower court.

It was not.

The same is true of most of the statement of facts of
respondent.

She filed but one affidavit in the lower court, and

that is found at page 314 of the record.

It does not address most

of the supposed factual assertions which plaintiff so liberally
sprinkles thoughout her Brief.

These alleged facts , to the

extent they have no basis in the record, should not be considered
as facts on appeal.
Such factual assertions not founded in the record do
perhaps illustrate the factual issues that should have been dealt
with in an evidentiary hearing at the trial court level.

It is

the position of defendant that the Stipulation and Decree should
be vacated and an evidentiary hearing conducted in the lower court
to resolve the many disputed issues of fact existing bewteen the
parties and noted by plaintiff in her Brief.
Plaintiff asserts at page 2 of her Brief that there were
$110,000 of assets in the marriage and that she got $9,000 plus
the $23,000 (which is the subject of this appeal) for a total of
$32,000.

If indeed no assets have been acquired with indemnity

money, and if indeed all of the property is marital property, and
if it amounts to $110,000, one would suppose that plaintiff would
welcome a full evidentiary hearing in order to get a full $55,000

-2-

o f t h e ma ri t a1 e s t a t e, ra t her t han j ust ac cep t the $ 3 2 f 0 0 0 she is
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to plaintiff's assertion and to demonstrate to the Court that if
an evidentiary hearing were granted, there is substantial evidence
in support of defendant's position.
On page 4 plaintiff asserts that the money received from
Jelco of approximately $113,000 was not a gift, but rather was
compensation income.

In our original Brief we acknowledge that

the amount was treated by Jelco as a payment to the defendant, and
the parties did indeed include it in their income tax return. It
was nevertheless a voluntary payment, and in that sense was indeed
a gift.

The William Kibbee Affidavit (R.290) states clearly:
M

3. The above amount (referring to $113,000
mentioned in the prior paragraph) included voluntary
weekly payments plus a JELCO, INC., profit sharing plan.
This volunatarily paid plan ($8,400) and was not in any
way based on Allen Birch's earnings prior to the
accident, nor were we legally obligated to make any of
these.
"4. The above amount ($113,000.00+) was personal
injury compestation to our employee." (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff sets forth on page 4 her recollection of the
meeting with the judge on January 21, 1986, but here again those
matters should have been included in an affidavit in the lower
court.
On pages 4 and 5 of her Brief plaintiff disputes that in
the Court's computations the Court determined that at least
$10,000 of the house did come from indemnity money and was to be
doubled for inflation, giving defendant no less than the $20,000
equity in the home. Plaintiff states she was not present when
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that was discussed.
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to* ion • u*-- snaotj.ru-ji\ no

obtain the loan, and in connection therewith that plaintiff
forwarded a Quit-claim Deed to the property to him which was in
fact recorded.

The defendant's decision to seek to vacate the

Decree of Divorce occurred thereafter and has been in process ever
since.

The Decree of Divorce of course constituted a lien against

the property until vacated, and that notwithstanding the Quitclaim Deed, and still constitutes a lien against the property.
Plaintiff has in no way been injured by that occurrence, nor has
defendant attempted to take advantage thereof.

The house has been

set aside as a supersedeas bond on this appeal, and the plaintiff
is fully secured for whatever determination the Court may make
with respect to a division of the house.
At page 2 of her Brief plaintiff alleges that the total
estate was $110,000; however, at page 6 she appears to agree with
the defendant's figures as to the amount of the €>state at the time
of the commencement of this action as being approximately $41,300,
not including the house.

She then argues that she didn't get half

the $41,300. The fact of the matter is, however, that on or about
June 9, 1983, the plaintiff came to the defendant and told him
that she was leaving, went down the basement and took the silver
(amounting to $6,000), and as she left, told the defendant he
could have what was left. The plaintiff also took a car worth
$2,250, her A. G. Edwards account, which actually had approximately $3,000 in it at the time, a diamond ring worth $1,500.
She was later awarded $2,000 by Commissioner Peuler from a
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Rigtrup's

reference to defendant's investment activities as "dabbling" are
all indications of bias which occurred after the disqualification
hearing and are acts complained of by defendant in his initial
Brief herein and timely brought before this Court. The argument
on pages 27 to 2 9 of the Brief make amply clear that defendant
complains of Judge Rigtrup's bias on both occasions.

Even if the

Court should feel that timely appeal was not made from Judge
Daniels1 Order, the bias of Judge Rigtrup after that hearing ha&
been properly brought before the Court as error on this appeal.
It should also be noted that at the hearing on August 17
the Court apparently had not even read the Affidavits of the
defendant (R.395, p.4), suggesting that he had already made up his
mind.
POINT II. THE HOUSE WAS PAID FOR WITH INDEMNITY MONEY.
As noted in Appellant's Brief, the house was
substantially paid for in full with money received by reason of
defendant's accidentf which money was intended as compensation for
the destruction of his body, and therefore ought to be considered
as his separate property, and the house purchased with it ought
also to be considered such.
The only assertion which plaintiff appears to make
against that fact is the bald assertion that it was not so paid,
but this is not supported by any credible evidence. Plaintiff
attempted to point out that the initial down payment was paid
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before the indemnity money was received, but that is not the fact.
The original indemnity money of $28,873.25 was indeed received
prior to March of 1975, notwithstanding plaintiff's assertion to
the contrary.

From that amount $9,572.13 was used to buy the home

(together with $500 Earnest Money deposit).

This left $19,300,

and that, together with other moneys as heretofore noted, were
added together, and the entire amount brought from New Mexico in
the form of a cashier's check deposited in Salt Lake City in the
total amount of $29,557.66.
POINT III. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE GRANTED RELIEF FROM THE
STIPULATION AND DECREE.
In Point III of Respondent's Brief she sets forth no
defenses to this point other than to simply concede that defendant
was severely handicapped as contended, and that he is still
handicapped, and therefore there is no change of circumstance.
Defendant's objection to the Stipulation and the Decree based
thereon is not that there has been a change of circumstances
between that time and the present, but rather that the Stipulation
was improvident for a severely-handicapped person at that time, is
still so improvident, and that it was entered into through duress.
Even plaintiff admits, at page 2 of her Brief, that defendant is
"a very sick man." Plaintiff does not really address the points
raised by defendant under this point, and therefore no further
response would appear to be required.
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POINT IV.

THE STIPULATION AND DECREE SHOULD BE VACATED

FOR FRAUD.
In Point IV of plaintiff's Brief she discusses the
matter of setting aside the Decree of Divorce for fraud complained
of by defendant in his Point IV.

On pages 8 and 9 of her Brief

plaintiff admits that she was sending the child support money to
New Mexico.

She there asserts for the first time that she had it

sent to her in Utah while she was living with defendant, but the
defendant nevertheless in his affidavit has asserted that the
parties were supported entirely by his income (R.284), not from
any of that money.

The plaintiff's assertion that the money sent

to New Mexico was somehow used for family purposes here in Utah
ought to have been included in an affidavit in the lower court,
and there should have been an evidentiary hearing on that matter.
The only evidence which this Court can consider in that regard is
that the money was sent to New Mexico and was not used for family
purposes, but rather saved up by plaintiff or spent for her own
purposes, as the child was being supported by defendant.
The plaintiff's assertions with regard to her employment
on page 9 likewise should have been included in an affidavit on
lower court, and those assertions are therefore not competent to
be considered at this time.

Even so, the plaintiff does not

satisfactorily answer the discrepancy between her income on the
W-2 of $1,837 per month as opposed to the $1,400 which she showed
on her financial declaration in the divorce proceedings. This
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amounts to a discrepancy of $437 per month or $5,244 per year, and
the disposition of this money is a legitimate issue.
POINT V.

AT THE VERY LEAST DEFENDANT SHOULD BE

AWARDED THE FIRST $20,000 FOR THE HOUSE AND AT LEAST ONE-HALF
OF THE REMAINDER.
Respondent asserts at page 5 of her Brief that there was
no determination by the Court to award defendant $20,000 "off the
top."

The plaintiff is in error, and we have discussed that

matter at page 5 of this Brief.
Plaintiff, it appears, should have no serious objection
to a full evidentiary hearing, stating at page 11 of her Brief:
"I am sure a full evidentiary (hearing) would have been to my
benefit."

Also on page 11 the plaintiff asks that she be awarded

the home and that defendant be allowed to live in it for a
reasonable time. Plaintiff points out that " . . . if Allen had
been paying a modest rent of $250 a month it would add up to
$15,000 in five years." This suggestion, although clearly
excessive, is similar to an alternative suggested in Appellant's
Brief that if the Court feels that plaintiff is entitled to any
distribution relating to the house, the amount the defendant is
required to pay the plaintiff be paid directly to the plaintiff,
without interest, without the necessity of a bank loan, which
would imperil defendant's equity and subject him to the danger of
a foreclosure.

The other possibility suggested, by the plaintiff's

own assertion is that the defendant should be allowed to live in
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the home for a period of time before any distribution. If
defendant were allowed to live in the home for life, then the home
could be sold upon his death and an equitable amount distributed
to the plaintiff.
POINT VI. DEFENDANT'S EDUCATION IS NOT A MARITAL ASSET.
On page 12 of her Brief the plaintiff asserts that the
defendant's engineering decree is an asset.

That is not the law,

but in this case, where the defendant is unable to work, his
engineering degree is not an asset and is not an item that can
or should be taken into consideration in a property settlement
between the parties.
Furthermore, plaintiff's implication in bringing this
matter up is misleading.

The parties were married in June of

1968, and the defendant graduated from the University of New
Mexico in December of 1972. Of the 54 months in this period
defendant went to school 30 months and worked 24 months. While
attending school defendant always worked part time, and for 24 of
the 30 months that he was in school, he was on scholarship, which
paid full tuition and books. During the 24 months that defendant
was not in school he worked construction jobs in various parts of
the country, never working less than 70 hours a w.eek. When
plaintiff and defendant were married, the plaintiff brought with
her a daughter by a previous marriage, who never received any
child support from her father and, although the plaintiff did work
during the school years, the principal support for plaintiff,
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defendant and the child of the first marriagef even during that
period of timef came from the defendant.
Defendant is unable to ascertain what plaintiff means
by a "construction option." Although defendant did specialize in
construction in school, that specialty did not require an extra
year.
Here again these matters were not brought out in the
court below and are asserted at this point to rebut plaintiff's
assertions and to demonstrate that factual issue is present for
evidentiary hearing in the court below.
Plaintiff makes assertions on pages 12 and 13 with
respect to defendant's conduct during the marriage which are not
only irrelevant, but not proper to be asserted at this time on
appeal.
However, as plaintiff raises the issue, the fact of the
matter is that the plaintiff left the defendant because she did
not want to be restricted by marriage to a paraplegic.

Such a

life was too confining for her, and she wanted her freedom. At
page 13 of her Brief plaintiff rightly identifies defendant's
feelings of anger and frustration over his accident.

But more

than that, it has not been easy for defendant to have his life's
companion leave him with his broken body and to see her take up
her life with another man.

To compound his frustrations, he has

only seen his daughter one day in 5 years, as plaintiff and
daughter live in New Mexico and, although the mother has been to
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Utah a number of times since the divorce, she has never brought
the daughter to see defendant except one time.
Defendant is alone and abandoned by his family.
are frustrations indeed.

These

Defendant has learned to cope with these

disappointments; at least he is doing his best.
Plaintiff's claim that she left because of physical
abuse is false. There was one episode: On June 6, 1983,
plaintiff's daughter by her first marriage, who was then 23 years
of age, was in the home watching a video which had obscene
language and to which the defendant objected because his own
daughter and other small children were in the house. When
plaintiff's daughter by her first marriage refused to turn off the
television, the defendant went over and turned the television off,
at which time the stepdaughter screamed loudly and brought the
plaintiff into the room from upstairs, where she had been taking a
nap.

Plaintiff used vile and unfitting language at, and

physically attacked defendant, attempting to strike him while he
was standing on a crutch, using his leg braces. He grabbed the
plaintiff by the collar and held her at a distance from him so
that her attempts to strike him and kick him were futile. While
being thus held, the plaintiff reached onto a table, picked up a
two-pound carton of cottage cheese, threw it and hit defendant
directly in the face with it.

In response defendant's hand went

from plaintiff's collar to her eye. This occurred so rapidly that
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the defendant believes it was a reflex.

Thereforef this "physical

abuse" was nothing more than a reflex attempt at self-defense.
That episode did not make it impossible for plaintiff to
stay in the marriage.

It was at best the excuse she was looking

for to leave defendant and seek her freedom away from a household
encumbered by paraplegia.
It should further be noted that the defendant, as a
paraplegic, is in no position to take any kind of a battle to
anyone.

If there is going to be a battle, someone has to bring

it to him.
One would think that plaintiff would at least feel
sufficient compassion for her former spouse and the father of her
daughter to want to see him able to live in a home adapted to his
needs, even if she chooses not to live with him.
Defendant likewise objects to the itemization of
attorney's fees set forth on page 13 as not a proper matter to be
raised in plaintiff's Brief, nor to be considered by this Court.
The defendant has likewise had substantial expenses, and in fact
his living expenses, legal expenses and medical expenses have
totally eliminated all stocks, bonds and savings which he formerly
had, and defendant is totally impoverished except for his Social
Security, whatever interest he has in the home and some modest
household furnishings and a modest 1976 Oldsmobile automobile
which is specially adapted to his needs so that he can get around
and be somewhat independent.
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On page 14 the plaintiff quotes from the transcript
of Judge Daniels. The statement by Judge Daniels is totally
irrelevant and erroneous. The matter before Judge Daniels was
the bias or non-bias of Judge Rigtrup, and Judge Daniels was not
hearing the matter of setting aside the Decree for fraud.

Further-

more, Judge Daniels' undertanding of the law is not correct if he
is asserting that a stipulation in a divorce case solely involves
the law of contract.

Any divorce case, whether resolved by

stipulation or trial, involves to a substantial and inescapable
degree the equities as they exist between the parties. Stipulations are subject to approval of the court, and parties cannot
by stipulation remove the court from its role as the final
arbitrator of the equities as they exist between the parties.
At page 1 of her Addendum the plaintiff asserts that the
$1,717 was for the sale of a pickup.

That amount was not from the

sale of a pickup truck, but rather was an income tax refund for
1974 as shown on the form 1040 included in the Addendum hereto.
Defendant does desire to point out, however, that the socalled savings account shown in the appendix to plaintiff's Brief
is an account into which only defendant's money was deposited.
Any money coming, to the plaintiff was kept in a totally separate
account and used by her for her own purposes.
The defendant respectfully moves that the financial
records set forth in the plaintiff's Addendum be stricken and/or
ignored by the Court, together with the definition of "part-time
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employee" shown in the Addendum, together with all of the
"evidentiary assertions" made by the plaintiff throughout her
Brief which were not set forth by affidavit or otherwise in the
lower court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we respectfully pray that the
relief requested by defendant in his Appellant's Brief herein be
granted*

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed four copies of the foregoing Brief to plaintiff/
respondent, Sybil R. Brooks, at her address:
SW, Albuquerque, New Mexico

6036 Appelton Road

87105, postage prepaid, the

day

of April, 1988.

Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
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AGREEMENT

btfJWl*

6036 Appleton Road SW
Albuquerque, New Mexico 8^105

AND NOTICE OF CONTRACT
The undersigned hereby acknowledge and agree that pursuant to

the terms of that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract of like date hereof]
the undersigned, GLENN A. JOHNSON and ESTELLA D# JOHNSON, his wif<|
have sold, and the undersigned, ALLAN G. BIRCH and SYBIL R« BIRCH,
his wife, as joint tenants, with full rights of survivorship and not a#tenants in common, has purchased that certain real property situate in
Salt Lake County,

State of Utah, and described as follows:All of Lot 32, TAYLORSVILLE GARDENS NO. 1, according
to the official plat thereof recorded in the office of the]
County Recorder of said County.

v
/,%
~}'

The undersigned do further agree that there is an unpaid bal-

ance owing under said Uniform Real Estate Contract in the amount of
$ 22,000. 00 which amount of said ALLAN G. BIRCH and SYBIL R. BIRCH,
his wife, agree to pay, and the said GLE^NN A. JOHNSON and ESTELLA D\
JOHNSON, his wife, agree to accept as provided in and subject to the
terms of said contract.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed our hands suuj
seals this

day of January

.JAW301975

Recorded

flj^

.

«>™--~

Request
KATIE L DIXON, Recorder

U
9 ^W

l^J

Sali Lake County, Utah
,
By "tPrfiftk &Us^~£mli

h ^93-**r-r •

&%^
(2, /*LL*/
Allan G. Birch
^^^y Birch /f $<^^&

Sybil 41.

/ ' % ^ j T i S S T A T E OF UTAH
'*' > -"' •-J ^ : ;UBOUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On t h e / ^ ^ d a y of January, 1975, personally appeared before
^Ihttrc 'Glenn A. JLohnson and Estella D. Johnson, his wife, the signers of the
\\ foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the
j isteme,
I My commission expires: J^^M^f/^ /97f
Residing at:^j^
tmS-

y^7

/s

/7 s

/?*

Co
OF NEW MEXICO
, - »\*^Y\ On the /JT day of January, 1975, personally appeared before
Co
meJIflSaSiG, Birch and Sybil R. Birch, his wife, the signers of the foregiinj*/ i£*'Ijjhiment, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the samel, Co
My ..commission expires; ^ ^ 0 ^ ?<Residing a t ^ , f f f O^M^^^J

•Pi,
/

\

9

\.

f\

Notary Public

y^^L.

UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
^
1

THIS AGREFMENT, made m duplicate this

day of

.Tnmiary

mi

A D , 19.25—,

by and botv^tn GLENN A. JOHNSON and ESTEI,T,A D, JOHNSON^ his wifV»
hereinafter designate I as th, Sellei an J M J L A N

ft-

BTRCH and

SYT^TT, R t

TURHH,

hi R

Wlf^

as lomt tenants*, with full rights of aurvwotship nnri not ns tnnnntR in pnmmnn f
hereinafter designated a* the Buy r of

.

r
2 WITNESSETH That the Seller foi the consideration heiein mentioned agrees to sell and com »y to the buyer,
and the buyei for t U cons dciition k u i n mentioned apices to puuhasc the following: desenbtd real property, situate in

the county 0 fSalt Lake

state of Utah to wit 2122 West Lindsay, Salt Lake City, Ut.
AOCRESS

More particulaily described is follows

All of Lot 32, TAYLORSVILLE GARDENS NO, 1, according to the official plat
thereof recorded in the office of the Coitnty Recorder of said County.
(Together with Refrigerator, Carpet, Drapes, Food F r e e z e r . )
Subject to easements, restrictions and right of ways appearing of record.

3
TWO

Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of
T H O U S A N D znd

NO/lCM-*.-

-

-

THIRTY

Dollars <j 3 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ?

payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order • • — - - - — • - - - — - • — - - - - - - — . - • . » • - — .->»•»--

stnetly withm the following times to wit TEN THOUSAND and NO/100
cash the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $

-,-«.-

- - - ,j 10.000.00

2 2 x j 0 0 t 00

}

shall be paid as follows

^$250.00 or more on the 1st. day of April, 1975 and $250.00 or more on the 1st.
day of each and every month thereafter until entire Seller's equity, together with
interest on the contract balance, is paid m full.^
It is understood and agreed that said monthly payments shall include general
property taxes and hazard insurance premiums, said taxes and insurance p r e miums to be paid by the Seller when due and added to the contract balance.
In the event the annual property taxes or fire insurance premiums increase, the
monthly payment hereof shall thereafter be increased by 1/12 ol the said annual
increase in taxes and 1/12 of a one vear increase in fire insurance o r e m m m
Possesbion of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the
4

Lbl.

day of

^yiarch

t

in 7 5

,

Said monthly payments aie to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the

principal Inteiest sh-U be chaiged fiom
M a r c h 1, 1 9 7 5
_ o n a j] unpaid portions of the
purchase price ut the late o f — L i g h t
per cent (
Q
r() p e r annum The Buyer at his option at anytime,
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payment* upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any moitgage
or contract b} the Buyei heicm assumed such excess to be applied cither to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future
installments at the election of the buyei which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made
5 It s understood and agiccd that if tin Sellei accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according
to tne terms heiein mentioi e i th n by o domp it will in no w iv altci the turns of the cont act as to the forfeiture
hcreinaft i stipulated oi as to iny other lemedies of the seller
6

It s undu stood that theic picsertly exists an obligation against said property in favor of Z l Q f l S

National

Bank

? 7 t 377 51

First

with an unpaid balance of

%
lb

of January 1. 1975

,

r

" Sel'er represents th it t h u c are no unpai 1 special improvement distnct taxes covering improvements to said premises now in the piocess of Icing installed, or which have been completed and not paid for outstanding against said property except the following
no exceptions
^
8

The Seller is given the o| tion to secure execute and maintain loans seemed by said prop< rty of not to exceed the

then unpaid contract balance hereunder healing interest at the rate of not to exceed

.^^SM?

percent

r
( "
<) per annum and payable m legulai monthly installments piovided that the agrregate monthly installment
payments required \o be made bv Sellei on said lo vns shall not be greatei than each installment payment required to be
made by *he Buvet under this eontiaet When the p w c i p a l due heieunder has been reduced to ne amount ot any such
loan* and moi tgages O t Sellei agtees to u n v i y and the Buyer agtees to accept title to the arove described property
subject o said oans and moitgic.es
(
) If the Ru\ r k ir<s to i\( m s r his njrht through accelerated navm nts jr lor this "T« a m' i 'i* tf pey of* nny ob1—
gatiors ouUtanc ng at date of this a g i e u m n t against said property it shall be the Buyers obligation to assume and
pay any penalty wmch may be required on prepayment of sail pr or jbhg"tions Prepayment penaltus in respect
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall b» paid by seller unless
sa u obligations are assumed or approved by buyer
10 Tne Buyer ag*- es upon wnttcn request of the Seller to make application to a ichable lendir for a loan of such
amount as tan be secured under the rcgulatioiu^of
said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon
the purchas xprice above mentioned and to ef*r t the papers requited uid i uv one half the exjenscs necessary in ob*aimnf sau
an the Sella agreeing to pay the other one half provided howevu that the monthly pa_,nunts and
nures* ratP required ^nail not exceed *hc monthly pay nents and mtciest lute as outlined above
11 ^he "*i^ r agrees to pay ill tuxes and assessments of ev«.ry kir d and n iture which are or which may be assessed
titd
wh 1 { jj jtcome due on th
j r*.mists during the life of tl i a j , m m i n l The ^ Her hereby covenants and agi ta
u
t a t the > c.n 0 ° sch men s aK unst said premises except the following
/

SLibjct l.o ,m> n.s.spssmunt^af c.iiung ^taxL-Mjuz&^rM125.^iJMai
R^jmion , Imprnvement P i s Lttic-t-

of Taylatjavillec

r4

The Seller further covenants ind igrees that he will not default in the payment of his ol ligations against sail proputy
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STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT
FILE

3366

LaMar Staker, Inc., Realtor
Real Estate Co.

3UYEK ..Al)i&.G*.3ix:ch.axiASybiL.&..JZxzciL

,—,DATE

WERTY A D D W ^ J S ^
JELLERS NAME

J^U&IX*LJ19JJI,

<>uw»#«

rf »«»**9*- ^ ^ . ^ » . . . . . ^ . , . . . . ^ ^

Glej3n.A*...ajld.-Eatella.D*..J.QhnjSQn,

POSSESSION DATE
'"'"iji 1 "'^""

Exp<

ITEMS

32;,Q0Q- &

Purchase Price
Insurance Premium Unexpired

Crests'

Buyer to obtain own i n s u r a n c e

Insurance Premium toaatpnot New policy (Transamerica Ins. Co. V

M.

m

x*

XX

New Insurance Policy for

XX

Reserves:

**^

Attorney's Opinioo

31 00

Closing Fee

m.

Recording Notice of Contract

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

xx>

xx:

XX

mom>"»fii'

Deposit to LaMar Staker. Inc.. Realtor

MX

Mortgage Balance Assumed by Buyers at:

xx
xx
xx
xx

Mortgage Balance Assumed by Buyers at:
Contract Balance Assumed

M a r c h 1,

1975

Interest Due and Assumed at:
Interest Due and Assumed at:
Taxes Assumed by Buyer to:

March L

1 9 7 5 ( b a s e d Ol 1 9 7 4 t a x e s

All Util. to be Read & Paid by Seller

&

sra

,XiU*i

XX
XX
XX
XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

xx

XX

mm SXL
31

45

To date of Possession

T

Mortgage Assumption Fee

Sewer and water shall be paid to date of possession by Seller
Total
Balance
Balancing Totals

ttMl

1 "#ipNp J

20. B2» ffi 2L
9,572 13

VuAll

Remarks:

&

a

33»,ffl

Accepted:
«•« »•* •• M O * »•**««. *"*•*»? #•*• •*»«>« t *«»»» •••?» *• ••»«•* »*• «*.«.** •»•*

GARY A. WESTON
Attorney at Law
533 South 2nd East 328-9782
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

HfH«UlM.*H«HtltW.M«Mf»l>««W»«t«1^«M(

PURCHASER'S RECEIPT
Adobe Acres Office

J
J

The First National Bank in Albuquerque
Albuquerque, New Mexico
DATE

PAYEE
S

9S-27
1070

SAW A. vestas

12721

4m u f im

* racsrieoSr

V

ilWVS

m, :llf:||7I!^iiil3f»
CUSTOMER'S

AlUS C, 331®

CASHIER'S CHECK

MEMO:

FOR-

^,TELLER

NON-KrEBOTJABLE

Qmht o*d c i »tfc#* ***** t*mm4 im a**€**m or d*»o»*

&**-*Ci v.jxjiir VL3**6C««

O€**0Si~ f O *

OATS

_J?r/iT

1HJ AG-30 W

**Zi£

*v?v«2r'~

•T--.4

T%r*TtOUWT Of

ADDRESS
TOTAL

*«**

^5 6

»e v » » *

The First National BafVk in Albuquerque
Albuquerque N M

,* • •* '

s., 14158

nnsT * A T \ Br r : a r> c \ cr c
DOLLAR**

,-•,

CASHIER'S
* U •

r»

CHECK
'• *

•'i:

- T

-,

<J . O

i IMiJ

; , j tfW,<&• Individual InpomQ Tax ReturnV;'

UWl*fr

fdt it&~t~°f J4<ui«y 1-Otcomt>#f 31. 19/A, or other tax oh* year w s t a m n g ' j . 1 . ^ J J . V « £ « . _ . » 1974 ending JU*'
m»m

ii

i,

-*» i

JI • • — — — — —

win

i i i» I, m+m+mmm*mmmHmmHm*k*v n 11 t i ' M

tui'ii •

i»n>

n numi

COUNTY OF
RESIDENCE

19
•

•

mi

HI

Your cociat \<*vunty number
Spouse'^ s»oc««ii security n u .

I* L 2.1.22^- W&LT.-J^M&SAy.! „,hl„ L-K —
fv

|

/ . « . - » K.« jnct. Mjr».d zifuoJ.

*TUU(/lab«l within UioU

(nting
£Vnt
i » * « r C,r , U ffli/
Status (check only one) y

pition | spouse's *•

. ^EyotnptlOHS
M*?
6a Yourself

ln;j | jmt return ^uven »t omy one hau income)
jng sopdf ttety. If spouse is also filing give
Dal secunty number in designated spec* a&i*p

•-

a

uic>
>

, -i
I J( 1

Q

Ent«r
nunber
of uo*«S
c h t c k t d p*

b Spou$« • ' • • * • i{gj ' " Q
LI *
c firs\ nameaof'your dependent children, who iive*-1 wth

you . ' ^ S h \ } l f t

• , T •• *

—

•"' *
«—r^—fof^t't
d Number of other dependents/ijpnv
Bth dtptnuent child (Ytar spous* ditUK 19 )
7 Total exemptions caimed
bctiof^ k . Do you yisb.tytftttoiace S V ^ j M f o w t feM$;4ft&<V*
pk . . " P

If •oint return/doe$ your spouse *rish to designate flTV . ,

Lx

:

—^j^A^t^i^4^^—'^—

l<fd Ol Huuteuuld <*•• tnitr«*tto<tt on f * f t I )

'

Regular / 65 or over / Blind
. . % . jfcfl

v

*>
*\t

UL
^

- yuwr >*\ v

.

f«-4ucr yaur r u id

^ r

-r?

"-(Altec* Termi W-tMMi>-^.li V A ' . / , p ^ y* K
Isaurus, tips, and other employee compensation
A «bu, ttt tmuae«o«* ^> M^« 3-p» / / * >. >* t ^
SSLUL22..
/

I ft«* )«tt/WCtl9A«
»»tt/Mcti9«a \ _

^

« * * i . . '

i

t *

»

?

» J

^

lndS\o.n
S1 fH*t 6 trd tiJS
. 10b Less exclusion ! ' , . _ _ , M i o w • r
[.v.dfends
»<inu other alsUtbuttons are over $400, //sr in r^H i or Sch^iu/e &.}
,f
4
o r ,C3S e n l e r
t income. T * ^ °
i
total without listing in Schedule Q l
L H over S4Q0, enter tota| and list in Hart 11 cj* Schedule B j ^
le other than wrige*, dividends, and interest (from Ijno 3 3 ) } . . 9 m*%\\

IOC

l[add lines 9, IQc, 1 1 , and 12)
*..",.,
Jments to mcoTic (such «is "sick pay," movijig expenses, etc. from hne'43) .
ct line 14 from line 13 (adjusted gross income)

13;
14
15

$,- >
^ *
«v,'

./.<r.6.V^".

lemize deductions and line 15 is under $10,000, find tax In Tables and enter on line 16.
Reductions or line 15 is $10,000 or more, go to line 44 to figure tax.
it unejwed income and can be cioimed 3^ a iiept' ent un your patent s return, check here • Q and ^e instructions on pa^e 1
btck if from

Trtx Tables 1 -12 !
Schedule 0

y

Tax Rate Schedule X, Y, or I
Form 4726
Schedule G OR

r3dits (from line 54^
.
Ux (suDtract hnf* 17 from fine 16)
axes (fjpm hne 6 1 )
d«j lines 18 and 19)
|i*'fer J! income tfix withheld (attncli Forms I
VV-2P 1 i front)
|_21o
'imLtej tax (jdyiiLnts (include amount j
iV, credit from 1 J / 3 return)

A 2 9.

h-

\ ^aid w *h Fori'! 4c68, Application fur Autonntic 1
ul TIITH to file U .> Inaiwidiiat Income Tax Return I
.ymi»nts (fiom l-ne 6b>
|
dd hnet. Ala, b. c, and a)

c_
d

I

>4 * »"<*•'

pie (if filing luinlly. BOTff must Jlgn n a n it orly one hid mcoinc)

Kh .?_

-xl

^^79

on i>ag« / )

24
25
j

\ '
t

X7./7

1-

/ 7/7

—

,.If _all
„ _of overpay
- . , ' f M t (hn
-J) i> t i ^e
itfunded (lin« 2 5 \ nuke no untiy un I H K ?I»

"^
>%

i-.j- i . u i e fty I »u^ij **riinme<l t*ni retu( . mcluu ut, awCi>.up4n/tn^ wl'«- ' «^ * " J -late nenU ami to i »« t>* * o. ^ > know ^ < - 4 u -*. Iict
$yv< U fc cl»*4 r .jn oLpr«iJifer ( o t W l h a n taxpayer) u tja»nJ on *.l ,ntotir*tu , el ^ h t 1 h- has iny knowlwi^e
Oate

ttftJffiH
.M

^JL9JZ

23

i f l u P i & J l O For n ' * . 10»-, t,r rt»t«mt»>» rs «t'«j<l v.l i>te in»>liucuot

2 is larjcr than »ine 20, enter amount OVERPAID
of Ine ?% to be REFUNDED TO YOU
ot I,re 24 to be cr.id |
j
1975 e*timatec< t^x • j 26 1

X£JL^\=-

% Pay amount on line 23
''
\//'/,\n full witn this return. <-;
^^Wnte social security >>
^ number on check or
^ money order and make - ^
is, paydble to
Internal
/
i^>' Revenue Service.
'^
22

C is ia«xer than line 22, enter BALANCE DUE IRS
* •

16
17
18
19

• y£Bti3UgBQafe,T^^y's,0RS
"l02OTijeras, N. E. - Suite G

-4//&/?&''

